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Introduction 
 
Portugal is among the few OECD countries that are often cited as examples 
every time traffic statistics are published. Unfortunately, the reason is that it tops the 
charts on accident and mortality figures. Also unfortunate is that the underlying causes 
remain a matter of speculation. 
This paper is the first systematic look at traffic policy in Portugal.  It is the first 
of three parts1 of a government-funded effort at sponsoring an empirical analysis of 
Portuguese policy on road mortality. Given that temporal statistics on traffic accidents 
have only recently begun to be collected, we are limited to traffic policies that have 
been implemented in the 1990s. We are also limited to aggregate data, given that there 
is no systematic collection on individual-level data in Portugal. Specifically, we 
examine the impact of a sentencing policy that raised the statutory penalties for reckless 
driving and other traffic offences in the mid 1990s. In 1995, Portugal ranked second 
only to Hungary in fatality rates on motorways (Page 2001). Were Portuguese drivers 
deterred by this increase in the severity? To what extent is this policy change associated 
with a reduction in the accident rate resulting in injury? It has become commonplace in 
criminology, especially among European criminologists (Tonry 2005), to almost expect 
an absence of a relationship between criminal acts and punishment, thus, of course 
contradicting deterrence theory. The bulk of the deterrence literature does not support 
the theory that changes in the severity of punishment for a penalty for a given offence 
have an effect on the commission of that offence (Paternoster 1987; von Hirsch et al. 
1999). This is particularly so when these changes are looked at independently of 
changes in the certainty of punishment and trade-off effects between deterrent 
                                                 
1 Parts two and three involve the elaboration, administration and analysis of the first national survey of 
driving attitudes and behaviour.  
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components that level the rise in the expected cost of punishment are ignored (Grasmick 
and Bryjak 1980; Mendes and McDonald 2002).  
We do not believe that we will find any evidence to support an affirmative 
answer to our research question. An unscrutinised look at the traffic accident figures 
numbers in the recent years certainly does not lead us in that direction.  It is our opinion 
that any reduction in traffic accidents in Portugal is more likely to be the result of a 
change in civic attitudes and behaviour at the wheel than from changes in penalties. 
Given that our present research design does not allow us to fully pursue this hypothesis, 
it is, of course, too soon for us to be able to address this issue. For now, we can only 
settle on a test of a deterrent impact on the motor vehicle accident rate in Portugal. 
The paper is organised as follows. Following a brief review of the literature on 
traffic accidents and mortality, we review the principal policies implemented in Portugal 
since the restoration of the democratic regime in the mid-1970s. Next, we conduct an 
interrupted time-series to analyse the particular policy interventions occurring between 
1995 and 2004. We finish with a discussion of the results. 
 
Traffic Safety: Deterrence vs. Civility 
 
Although the beginnings of the literature on traffic safety date back to the late 
1930s (Holcomb 1938), it was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s that empirical 
studies proliferated. It has since this time remained an active subject in applied public 
policy studies. One way to approach and summarize this literature is to identify two 
broad categories of studies dealing with traffic safety, independent of choice in the type 
of research design. One category of studies examines the effect of diverse government 
interventions aimed at deterring drivers from breaking the law, and, in this way, 
reducing traffic accidents and fatalities. The second category of studies looks at the 
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effects of policies that invest in road safety educational or awareness campaigns to 
achieve the same goal. 
The first category of studies is by far more numerous. Most of the literature 
focuses on negative deterrence, both perceptual and aggregate level. These studies 
investigate the effect of one or both of two types of deterrent strategies: 1) the threat of 
detection and punishment through legal and administrative sanctions, and 2) the 
disincentive of alcohol consumption through economic control policies. Both sets of 
studies fit under the negative deterrence label (Ehrlich 1973), given that both subsets of 
literature are aimed at increasing the expected cost of drunk and reckless driving.  
Most studies dealing with traffic safety investigate the efficacy of some form of 
punishment in discouraging traffic offences, most especially alcohol-related violations 
of the law. Since reckless and drunk driving is a form criminal behaviour, governments´ 
primary way of curbing it is to encourage compliance with the law by way of deterrence 
policies. Governments take it upon themselves to establish and enforce a system of 
controls so as to provide crime prevention and road safety. In doing so, they lay the 
foundation for an orderly transit system. Towards this end, governments rely on 
strategies that have, at least in theory, a chance of achieving these goals in the timeliest 
manner. Deterrence theory is a doctrine that makes that foundation possible by 
supplying a means with which to provide predictability in individuals´ behaviour. It is 
based on the assumption that individuals are rational beings. As such, individuals in 
society are induced to comply with the law through their reactions to incentives and 
disincentives. 
The most researched deterrence policies in the literature on traffic safety fall into 
three groups: 1) enforcement policies; 2) punishment policies; 3) regulatory policies. 
The first group of policies deals with the certainty of punishment in that they increase 
 4
the probability of getting caught breaking the law. Empirically speaking, of the three 
groups, this one is generally found to have the most significance; many studies only 
report significant results for this category. These policies include more visible police 
patrol efforts, sobriety checkpoints, and breath tests (Rhee and Zhang 1993; Jessie and 
Yuan 1998; Benson, Rasmussen, and Mast 1999; Schults et al. 2001; Fell et al. 2003; 
Richardson and Houston 2005). With respect to the second category, punitive policy 
tools in the literature on traffic safety fall under the category of legal and/or 
administrative sanctions. These basically refer to changes in fines and jail terms, as well 
as administrative forms of punishments, such as mandatory license 
suspension/revocation, and vehicles impoundment (Lanza-Kaduce 1988; Ross and 
Gonzales 1988; Legge Jr. 1990a; 1990b; Legge Jr. and Park 1994; Yu 1994; Dougherty 
1999; Benson, Rasmussen, and Mast 1999; McCarthy 1999; DeYoung 2000; Schults et 
al. 2001; Briscoe 2004; Richardson and Houston 2005). Regulatory policies refer to 
changes in the blood alcohol limit, changes in the minimum legal drinking age, 
mandatory seat belt laws, mandatory vehicle inspections, and ignition interlock 
inhibition programs (Fuchs and Leveson 1967; Cook and Tauchen 1984; Loeb and 
Gilad 1984; Asch and Levy 1990; Legge Jr. 1990a; Legge Jr. and Park 1994; Loeb 
1990; Keeler 1994; Fowles and Loeb 1995; Weinrath 1997; Jessie and Yuan 1998; 
Mann et al. 2001; Dee 2001; Eisenberg 2003).  
Since deterrence is about creating and modifying existing opportunities available 
to individuals, alcohol consumption control policies are also deterrent strategies. They 
are based on the increase in the cost of the consumption of alcohol. The idea of raising 
the price of alcohol through taxation so as to discourage its consumption is of course 
sensitive to the elasticity of demand. Numerous studies have examined the price 
elasticity so as to infer an effect of such policies on drunk driving (Grossman et al. 
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1987; Saffer and Grossman 1987; Coate and Grossman 1988; Laixuthai and Chaloupka 
1993; Chaloupla et al. 1993; Kenkel 1993; 1996; Mullahy and Sindelar 1994; 
Chaloupka and Wechsler 1996). 
A second grand category of studies on traffic policies is grounded on a moral 
dimension of human behaviour. The goal here is not to discourage prospective reckless 
driving by upping the costs associated with it, but rather to foster law-abiding driving by 
appealing to or instilling a sense of civility.2 Some authors believe the threat of legal 
sanctions to be ineffective, especially with its target population—frequent drunk and 
reckless drivers. In fact, although it makes sense to expect that individuals respond to 
incentives, these authors believe that this segment of the population does not perceive 
the threat of legal punishment in the same way as individuals who drink socially or who 
do not drink and drive at all (Houston and Richardson Jr. 2004). At best, deterrent 
policies end up deterring those drivers who on occasion break the law, thus, 
contributing minimally, if at all, to the reduction of the accident rate. 
A different type of road safety policy is directed at changing drivers´ attitudes 
and behaviours through publicity and advertisement campaigns that create a negative 
social construct surrounding the undesired or offending behaviour—in the case at hand, 
reckless and drunk driving  (Ross 1984; West et al. 1989; Tay 1999; 2002; 2004; 2005) 
and produce a sort of “threat of embarrassment” (Berger and Snortum 1986; Lanza-
Kaduce 1988; Green 1989; Akers 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, Jr., and Arneklev 1993). 
This approach is based on the premise of social learning theory that claims that criminal 
behaviour, as any other behaviour, is learned and that it is the result of exposure to 
different ideas and practices.  In this way, greater self-discipline on the motorways is 
something that can be aspired to by changing patterns of behaviour, cultures, customs, 
                                                 
2 Some authors argue that deterrent strategies promote this positive change in drivers´ behaviour in the 
long run  (Andenaes 1971; Snortum and Berger 1989; Deshapriya and Iwase 1996).   
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and definitions that are contrary to the ones initially instilled or taught to be socially 
acceptable.  
 
Portuguese Legal Reforms 
 
The seriousness of the traffic problem in Portugal has prompted the national 
government to enact several laws throughout the last ten years. The approval of the 
1994 Driver’s Code,3 replacing the previous 1954 Code, was the first organized and 
coherent effort to adopt comprehensive traffic policy legislation. In January 1998, the 
Portuguese parliament approved new legislation increasing fines for serious and very 
serious driving offences. The goal of this shift in legislation was to increase severity 
under the presumption that this would curb reckless driving, resulting in a significant 
reduction in the number of traffic accidents and road injuries and deaths. All previous 
laws had been piecemeal attempts to solve specific traffic problems and had failed to 
induce desirable road behaviour. 
Our period of analysis excludes these piecemeal legislative changes prior to 1994, 
beginning January 1995 and ending December 2004. This period is marked by three 
major modifications to the Code. Firstly, in January 1998, the Portuguese government 
approved legislation targeted at specific deterrence, i.e. individuals with reckless driving 
recurrent behaviour. This legislation established criteria to characterize drivers as 
recidivistic and to increase the maximum limits of traffic fines.  
The second major change during this ten-year period was the introduction of a legal 
limit of 0.2 g/l (grams per litre) of blood alcohol level.4 Drunk-driving offences are 
regarded by the general public as one of the major causes of traffic accidents and 
fatalities, and this new, extremely stringent limit was considered to be a way to produce 
                                                 
3 Law-Decree 114/94, May 3. 
4 Law-Decree 162/2001, May 22 and Law-Decree 265-A/2001, September 28. 
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significant reductions in these statistics. However, this decision did not hold for a long 
period of time. In fact, only eleven months after its statutory adoption, the 0.2-g/l level 
was revoked and the 0.5 g/l level was restored as the legal limit again5 as a result of 
pressures from the wine industry, one of the largest interest groups in the Portugal. 
The third main change in traffic policy was the introduction of mandatory “on-the-
spot” payment of fines.6 In order to assure higher efficacy in the application and 
collection of fines, this policy makes it compulsory for drivers stopped for a specific 
offence, to immediately pay the fine for that offence, as well as any other outstanding 
fines he or she may have.  
The policy changes enacted throughout the period, clearly point to an emphasis on 
the severity component of deterrence, although celerity of punishment is addressed by 
mandatory “on-the-spot” payment of fines approved in October 2001. The effect of both 
components is relatively easy to test when compared to the effect of changes in the 
certainty of punishment. Portuguese traffic policy has systematically failed to 
concentrate on the certainty component of deterrence. 
 
Data and Methods  
 
In this section, we conduct an interrupted time-series analysis. Specifically, a Box-
Tiao impact assessment analysis is employed to test the impact of the increase in fines 
as well as the introduction of “on-the-spot” payment of fines upon the number of traffic 
accidents and victims per registered vehicle. Public authorities promoting these policies 
anticipate a reduction in the rate of accidents, injuries and fatalities. Below we describe 
                                                 
5 Law 20/2002, August 21. A 0.5 g/l level is a 0.05 BAC (Blood Alcohol Concentration) or 0.05 of 
alcohol by volume. 
6 Law-Decree 265-A/2001. 
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the empirical models estimated, including the dependent variables, control variables, 
and intervention variables.  
The interrupted time series structural model is 
 
yt = Xtβ + µt 
 
where µt is the noise component of the series modelled as an ARIMA process. 
Following the model-building procedures recommended by McDowall et al. (1980), 
we identified an ARIMA (0,1,1)(0,1,1)12 model specification characterising the noise 
component (µt) of our interrupted time series models. The series were regularly and then 
seasonally differenced. The regularly and seasonally differenced series were then set 
equal to 1st and 12th-order moving averages. The disturbance of the structural equation 
is modelled as: 
µt = εt – θ1εt - 1 – θ12εt – 12 
Similar noise components characterise the fatalities per registered vehicles series 
and the injuries per registered vehicle series.  
We examine three dependent variables: 1) Accidents with victims per registered 
vehicle (Accident Rate) 2) Fatalities per registered vehicle (Fatality Rate), and 3) Total 
injuries in traffic accidents per registered vehicle (Injury Rate) from January 1995 to 
December 2004. These data were provided by the Direcção Geral de Viação 
(Department of Motor Vehicles). The Portuguese Automobile Trade Association 
provided the number of registered vehicles.  
Two control variables are used: vehicle inspections and precipitation. Vehicle safety 
inspections were made mandatory in Portugal in 1993. The number of automobile safety 
inspections per registered vehicle has increased significantly over the years covered by 
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our series and is thought to have had some impact in reducing the rate of road accidents. 
The rate of traffic accidents is likely to increase as a result of bad weather. The amount 
of precipitation (in millilitres) is employed to control for weather conditions. Vehicle 
inspections data is also available from the Department of Motor Vehicles and rainfall 
amounts are collected and made available by the Portuguese Institute of Meteorology. 
Table 1 presents descriptive summary statistics of all of the variables used. 
Ideally, certainty should be measured by indicators such as the probability of arrest 
or convictions for traffic violations, but these are not currently available in Portugal. We 
acknowledge that, in testing deterrence-based policies, it is important to include 
variables for all deterrence components, at this point, data limitations do not allow a full 
test of deterrence-based traffic policies.  
At this time, we also do not have data allowing the estimation of these interventions 
on gender or age groups. It is certainly possible that only certain groups change their 
behaviour as a product of these policy decisions, but, at this point, nothing can be stated 
regarding this. 
With regard to the policy interventions, the first intervention took place in February 
1998, the 37th month of these series. The second intervention occurred at on October 
2001, the 81st month of our series, when “on-the-spot” payment of fines began. Figures 
1, 2, and 3 represent both interventions in the non-differenced series. The first month of 
each series is January 1995, which allows us to conclude that each series peaks 
seasonally in the months of July and August. The three series show a clear downward 
trend during the period of analysis, without any abrupt shifts. 
 
[Figures 1-3 about here] 
   
 10
Findings 
 
Table 2 show the results of the Box-Tiao Intervention estimation. The findings show 
that none of the policy interventions caused the reductions observed in the three series 
under analysis. Portuguese drivers also do not appear to fear being stopped for reckless 
driving.  One rival reason for the lack of significant intervention results is the absence 
of implementation of these deterrence-based policies. The increase in the upper interval 
of the amount of fines charged may fail to dissuade reckless driving behaviour if police 
officers systematically apply fines in the lower bound. This kind of downward biased 
implementation is likely to render ineffective the increase in fines. 
As we have previously argued, the certainty component of deterrence cannot be 
tested at this moment, but the fact that drivers’ perceptions of being caught (and 
punished) are likely very low is the most plausible reason for the ineffectiveness of “on-
the-spot” payment of fines.7 
The automobile inspections variable has a negative impact on accidents, fatalities 
and injuries, confirming our prior expectations that safety inspections are fundamental 
when it comes to accident prevention. The result for the fatalities’ series is extremely 
robust, and it can be interpreted that each 100,000 vehicle-inspections saves 12 human 
lives. The cost-benefit impact of this result is certainly arguable, but the role played by 
inspections in accident prevention is incontrovertible. 
The other control parameter—precipitation—is positive across the board and 
statistically significant in two out of three estimations. This is consistent with the idea 
that bad weather conditions negatively affect road safety. 
 
                                                 
7 We also tested the impact of changes in BAC levels, but the findings were never statistically significant. 
The frequent law changes on the subject sends mixed signals and stimulate erratic rather than predictable 
behaviour. 
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Discussion 
 
These results do not come as a surprise, since prior findings by Houston and 
Richardson (2002) indicate that deterrence-based policies may increase perceptions of 
severity and certainty of punishment, but fail to translate into a significant change in 
behaviour. This argument certainly explains why public authorities and the general 
Portuguese public are usually extremely supportive of policy measures aiming at 
cracking down on reckless driving, but these policies do not translate into substantial 
impacts on the number of accidents and victims. 
There are two possible reasons for why these numbers do not reveal any deterrent 
effect associated with the increased severity of punishment, aside from the model 
specification limitations discussed above. As mentioned above, three features that 
produce the expected cost and that are under the immediate control of government 
authorities are: certainty of punishment (through the probability of arrest and/or the 
probability of convictions), the severity of punishment, and the celerity of punishment.  
Authors often argue that merely raising the penalties without investing in the perception 
of a higher probability of detection is the easy way for legislators to raise the expected 
cost of punishment. To register a dissuasive effect in the potential criminal’s mind, 
conviction must follow arrest and punishment must follow conviction; if criminals go 
unpunished, arresting loses much of its influence. On the flip side, if the severity of 
punishment for a given crime increases and drivers perceive that they are not getting 
caught, the increase in severity loses its dissuasive effect. For deterrent strategies to 
have any chance for success, they need to address the criminal behaviour as a “package” 
(Mendes and McDonald 2002; Mendes 2004).  
Even as “packages”, deterrent policy mixes may be doomed to failure. Bad driving 
may be the result of important factors other than what deterrence effects can tell us. 
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Portugal is often criticized for having long, winding roads. Several of the main 
highways are often cited as being unsafe. This, one would think, would require 
cautionary driving, however, the typical Portuguese driver is not known for being 
courteous. The friendliness disappears once he or she gets behind the wheel. Hidden 
police surveillance videos often reveal the most shocking and aggressive manoeuvres. 
Generally speaking, Portuguese drivers are risk takers; as such, the perceived expected 
cost of punishment behind deterrent prospective isolated changes in policies is likely to 
be underestimated.  A different and/or complementary policy approach—one that shoots 
for self-discipline—is needed. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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 Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Accident Rate Series 
 
88.68556 22.32678 53.43077 144.519 
Fatality Rate Series 
 
3.336469 1.217721 1.402263 6.830723 
Injury Rate Series 
 
119.6753 31.58426 70.772 206.0552 
Fines (0-1) 
 
.7 .460179 0 1 
On the spot Payment (0-1) 
  
.325 .4703387 0 1 
Automobile Inspections 
 
6266.783 1557.065 2678.22 10837.68 
Precipitation 
 
74.985 73.532 .2 321.3 
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 Table 2 – Box-Tiao Intervention Analysis (Step Function Models) 
 
 Accident Rate Fatality Rate Injury Rate 
 
Intervention Parameters 
Fines 
 
 
 
On the spot Payment 
 
 
.059 
(.765) 
0.08 
 
.209 
(.763) 
0.27 
 
 
.023 
(.055) 
0.42 
 
-.004 
(.050) 
-0.07 
 
 
.272 
(1.10) 
0.25 
 
.312 
(1.10) 
0.28 
 
Control Parameters 
Automobile Inspections 
 
 
 
Precipitation 
 
 
-.0012 
(.0008) 
-1.45 
 
.008* 
(.005) 
1.79 
 
 
-.00012*** 
(.00005) 
-2.69 
 
.0004 
(.0003) 
1.44 
 
 
-.0020 
(.0013) 
-1.46 
 
.013** 
(.006) 
2.04 
 
Noise Parameters 
MA (1) 
 
 
 
MA (12) 
 
 
-.397*** 
(.149) 
-2.67 
 
-.700*** 
(.166) 
-4.23 
 
 
-.456*** 
(.136) 
-3.36 
 
-.585*** 
(.165) 
-3.54 
 
 
-.402*** 
(.130) 
-3.10 
 
-.661*** 
(.151) 
-4.37 
 
σ 
 
 
5.156*** 
(.501) 
10.29 
 
.428*** 
(.039) 
11.10 
 
7.27*** 
(.670) 
10.85 
 
Constant 
 
-.730 
(.597) 
-1.22 
 
-.051 
(.050) 
-1.03 
 
-1.32 
(.814) 
-1.62 
 
χ2 
 
27.19 
 
29.26 
 
28.86 
 
Prob > χ2 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
N 
 
107 
 
107 
 
107 
Standard Errors in parentheses; t-statistics below standard errors;  
σ is the estimated variance of the white noise parameter 
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